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Accelerating the process of economic growth in a sustained manner is just about 
the most important policy issue in economics.  Economists have long used a variety of 
econometric approaches to shed light on why some countries grow faster than others.  
Early work focused on cross-section econometrics, with growth rates over two or three 
regressed on country characteristics and policies (Barro 1991, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
1992).  More recent work has focused on levels-regressions with incomes (rather than 
growth) as the dependent variable (Hall and Jones 1999, Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2001) and on panel econometrics which organizes the country-level data in 
averages over five-year or other intervals (Islam 1995, Caselli, Esquivel, and LeFort 
1996).  The policy prescriptions coming out of this work have tended to be summarized 
under three broad principles: openness, sound money, and property rights.  There are by 
now a number of good surveys and evaluations of this empirical literature, including 
especially Temple (1999), Durlauf (2003), and Easterly (2003).   
 
A curious aspect of this literature is that it does not focus on what is perhaps the 
most telling source of variation in the underlying data.  As Easterly et al. (1993) first 
pointed out and many others have reconfirmed since, growth performance tends to be 
highly unstable.  Very few countries have experienced consistently high growth rates 
over periods of several decades.  The more typical pattern is that countries experience 
phases of growth, stagnation, or decline of varying length (Pritchett 2000).  And standard 
growth theory, whether of the neoclassical or the endogenous variant, suggests that our 
best bet for uncovering the relation between growth and its fundamentals is to look for 
instances where trend growth experiences a clear shift. 
 
This point can be seen from Figure 1.1, which shows the implications of a 
(permanent) improvement in “growth fundamentals” at time T in the two classes of 
models mentioned above.  In the neoclassical growth model, growth accelerates at T, but 
eventually converges back to the growth rate prevailing prior to T (unless the 
fundamental in question is exogenous technological progress).  In endogenous growth 
models, growth accelerates permanently at time T.  But in both cases, if we are interested 
in identifying the relevant growth fundamentals, our best strategy would be to look for 
changes that happen in the economy at or before time T.  In other words, we can get 
significant mileage by identifying the turning points in growth experience and asking for 
what determines these transitions.  If instead we lumped together data on growth without 
paying attention to these turning points, we would be averaging out the most interesting 
variation in the data.     
 
By organizing the data around the turning points in growth experience, we also 
come significantly closer to answering the questions that most preoccupy policy makers.  
Policy makers want to know: how likely is it that an economy undergoes a significant 
acceleration of its rate of growth for a sustained period of time? What policies or other 
correlates seem to be associated with such transitions? What can be said about the causes 
of such transitions? Are they in line with current views as to the relative importance of 
economic reforms and institutions?  Policy makers may be rightly concerned about the 
possibility that while the standard cross-country regressions tend to get the determinants  
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right over a sufficiently long time period, they are very poor predictors of turning points 
of growth.   
 
 
  (a) Neoclassical growth model        (c) Endogenous growth model 
 
Figure 1.1:  Effect of improvement in growth fundamentals at time T 
 
 
They may also be concerned about the fact that growth regressions are based on 
very strong assumptions about a single linear model being appropriate for all countries in 
all states.  There are a large number of models in which countries can be in different 
“states” and can switch from state to state responding to factors that determine their long-
run equilibrium.  For instance, in models with “poverty traps” the relationship between 
policy variables and growth outcomes is not linear as a movement across a threshold can 
cause a switch from a “trap” state to a growth state.   
 
  Rather than postulate a common model of output determination and dynamics we 
address these issues head on in this paper with empirical methods that begin by 
identifying growth episodes and then examine their determinants.  We define a growth 
acceleration as an increase in per-capita growth of 2 percentage points or more (with 
most of the episodes we identify exceeding this threshold by a wide margin).  To qualify 
as an acceleration, the increase in growth has to be sustained for at least eight years and 
the post-acceleration growth rate has to be at least 3.5 percent per year.  In addition, to 
rule out cases of pure recovery, we require that post-acceleration output exceed the pre-
episode peak level of income.  Using this approach, we develop some new stylized facts 
about growth accelerations as well as analyze their predictability.   
 
Our basic results are as follows.  First, we find that growth accelerations are quite 
frequent.  Using Penn World Tables data we identify more than 80 episodes of rapid 
acceleration in economic growth that are sustained for at least eight years.  The 
unconditional probability that a country will experience a growth acceleration sometime 
ln y
    t     t  T   T  
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during a decade is around 25 percent.  Second, we find that growth accelerations tend to 
be correlated with increases in investment and trade, and with real exchange rate 
depreciations.  Third, political-regime changes are statistically significant predictors of 
growth accelerations.  Fourth, the nature of other determinants depends to some extent on 
whether the acceleration is sustained into the longer term or not.  External shocks tend to 
produce growth accelerations that eventually fizzle out, while economic reform is a 
statistically significant predictor of growth accelerations that are sustained.  Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, we find that growth accelerations tend to be highly 
unpredictable: the vast majority of growth accelerations are unrelated to standard 
determinants such as political change and economic reform, and most instances of 
economic reform do not produce growth accelerations.   
 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In section 2, we develop a filter to identify 
the instances in which countries experienced growth accelerations and discuss the 
resulting sample.  We also present some robustness analyses, including the use of the 
World Development Indicators dataset in lieu of the Penn World Tables.  Section 3 
discusses the basic characteristics of growth accelerations and their correlates.  Section 4 
explores the predictors of growth transitions.  Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Methods, descriptive statistics and robustness 
 
  2.A)  Methods and descriptive statistics 
 
We define the growth rate gt at time t over horizon n to be the least squares 
growth rate of GDP per capita (y) from t to t+n ( n t t g + , ˆ ) defined implicitly by the 
following: 
 
n i t g a y n t t i t ,.., 0 , * ˆ ) ln( , = + = + +  
 
The change in the growth rate at time t is simply the change in the growth over horizon n 
across that period: 
 
  t n t n t t t g g g , , − + − = ∆  
 
  We identify growth accelerations by looking for rapid growth episodes that satisfy 
the following conditions. 
  
peak episode pre exceeds output growth Post t i y y
s accelerate Growth ppa g
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We take the relevant time horizon to be eight years (i.e., n = 7).   
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The timing of the initiation of the growth acceleration is chosen by finding the 
year that maximizes the F-statistic of a spline regression with a break at the relevant year. 
That is, since for some countries there are a number of consecutive years for which these 
criteria of a growth episode are met, the “best” starting date is chosen by looking for the 
best fit among all contiguous eligible dates.  Countries can have more than one instance 
of growth acceleration as long as the dates are more than 5 years apart (so a country 
could accelerate from 0% to 3.5% in 1967 and then accelerate from 3.5% to 6.0% in 1972 
as two distinct episodes).   
 
We use the Penn World Tables (PWT) 6.1 as our baseline data source since this 
gives us data that go back to 1950.  We eliminate from our sample all countries with 
population less than 1 million, as well as all countries with fewer than 20 data points in 
PWT.  Since n = 7, the earliest and latest years for which we can identify episodes are 
1957 and 1992, respectively. 
 
    This filter yields a surprisingly large number of growth accelerations—83 
episodes in all.  Table 2.1 shows all of these episodes with the standard three-letter 
country abbreviation and the year of initiation.  The table is grouped by region and 
decade and within each sorted by the magnitude of the growth acceleration.  It is 
comforting to see that our method identifies most of the well-known episodes of growth 
acceleration that are commonly associated with discrete political changes or policy 
reforms (e.g. China 1978, Argentina 1990, Mauritius 1971, Korea 1962, Indonesia 1967, 
Brazil 1967, Chile 1986, Uganda 1989).  But the fact that there are so many instances of 
rapid growth indicates that growth accelerations are often produced by less noticable 
changes.  This is a point we will develop further when we turn to the analysis of 
determinants. 
 
  Aside from the sheer number of accelerations, the magnitude of the typical 
acceleration is also striking.  Conditional on a growth acceleration of at least 2 ppa, the 
average acceleration was 4.7 ppa (median 4.0).  This implies that in the typical episode 
output stood almost 40 percent higher at the end of the episode than it would have been 
without any acceleration.  Moreover, there are many episodes of accelerations of 7 
percentage points or more (e.g. Ghana 1965 (8.4), Pakistan 1962 (7.1), Argentina 1990 
(9.2)).  
 
We estimate the (unconditional) probability of a growth acceleration by dividing 
the number of episodes by the number of country-years in which an episode could have 
occurred. The latter is calculated by summing up all the country-years in our sample and 
eliminating a 4-year window after the occurrence of each episode, since our filter takes 
this period as belonging to the same episode. Applying this rule we obtain 3097 possible 
occasions in which an episode could have occurred. Dividing our 83 episodes by this 
number we get that the average probability of a growth transition in our sample is about 
2.7 percent per year. This means that a typical country would have about a 25 percent 
chance of experiencing a growth transition at some point in any given decade.  
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Table 2.1:  Episodes of rapid growth, by region, decade and magnitude of acceleration 






NGA 1967 -1.7 7.3  9.0
BWA 1969 2.9 11.7  8.8
GHA 1965 -0.1 8.3  8.4
GNB 1969 -0.3 8.1  8.4
ZWE 1964 0.6 7.2  6.5
COG 1969 0.9 5.4  4.5
1950s and 
1960s 
NGA 1957 1.2 4.3  3.0
MUS 1971 -1.8 6.7  8.5
TCD 1973 -0.7 7.3  8.0
CMR 1972 -0.6 5.3  5.9
COG 1978 3.1 8.2  5.1
UGA 1977 -0.6 4.0  4.6
LSO 1971 0.7 5.3  4.6
RWA 1975 0.7 4.0  3.3
MLI 1972 0.8 3.8  3.0
1970s 
MWI 1970 1.5 3.9  2.5
GNB 1988 -0.7 5.2  5.9
MUS 1983 1.0 5.5  4.4






MWI 1992 -0.8 4.8  5.6
1950s/60s PAK  1962 -2.4 4.8  7.1
PAK 1979 1.4 4.6  3.2 1970s 
LKA 1979 1.9 4.1  2.2
South Asia 
1980s IND  1982 1.5 3.9  2.4
THA 1957 -2.5 5.3  7.8
KOR 1962 0.6 6.9  6.3
IDN 1967 -0.8 5.5  6.2
SGP 1969 4.2 8.2  4.0
1950s and 
1960s 
TWN 1961 3.3 7.1  3.8
CHN 1978 1.7 6.7  5.1 1970s 
MYS 1970 3.0 5.1  2.1
MYS 1988 1.1 5.7  4.6
THA 1986 3.5 8.1  4.6
PNG 1987 0.3 4.0  3.7
KOR 1984 4.4 8.0  3.7




CHN 1990 4.2 8.0  3.8 
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Table 2.1 (cont.):  Episodes of rapid growth, by region, decade and magnitude of acceleration 






DOM 1969 -1.1 5.5  6.6
BRA 1967 2.7 7.8  5.1
PER 1959 0.8 5.2  4.4
PAN 1959 1.5 5.4  3.9
NIC 1960 0.9 4.8  3.8
ARG 1963 0.9 3.6  2.7
1950s and 
1960s 
COL 1967 1.6 4.0  2.4
ECU 1970 1.5 8.4  6.8
PRY 1974 2.6 6.2  3.7
TTO 1975 1.9 5.4  3.5
PAN 1975 2.6 5.3  2.7
1970s 
URY 1974 1.5 4.0  2.6
CHL 1986 -1.2 5.5  6.7
URY 1989 1.6 3.8  2.1
HTI 1990 -2.3 12.7  15.0







DOM 1992 0.4 6.3  5.8
MAR 1958 -1.1 7.7  8.8
SYR 1969 0.3 5.8  5.5
TUN 1968 2.1 6.6  4.5
ISR 1967 2.8 7.2  4.4
1950s and 
1960s 
ISR 1957 2.2 5.3  3.1
JOR 1973 -3.6 9.1  12.7
EGY 1976 -1.6 4.7  6.3
SYR 1974 2.6 4.8  2.2
1970s 






1990s SYR  1989 -2.9 4.4  7.3
ESP 1959 4.4 8.0  3.5
DNK 1957 1.8 5.3  3.5
JPN 1958 5.8 9.0  3.2
USA 1961 0.9 3.9  3.0
CAN 1962 0.6 3.6  2.9
IRL 1958 1.0 3.7  2.7
BEL 1959 2.1 4.5  2.4
NZL 1957 1.5 3.8  2.4
AUS 1961 1.5 3.8  2.3
FIN 1958 2.7 5.0  2.2
1950s and 
1960s 
FIN 1967 3.4 5.6  2.2
PRT 1985 1.1 5.4  4.3
ESP 1984 0.1 3.8  3.7
IRL 1985 1.6 5.0  3.4
GBR 1982 1.1 3.5  2.5




NOR 1991 1.4 3.7  2.2 
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Another way of expressing the high rate of occurrence of growth accelerations is 
to note the proportion of countries that experience at least one such episode.  Our data set 
allows us to search for growth accelerations for a total of 110 countries during the 36-
year period between 1957 and 1992.  (Note however that for many countries we are 
restricted to a shorter span of time.)  Of these, 60 (or 54.5%) have experienced at least 
one growth acceleration and 23 (or 20.9%) have experienced two accelerations.   
 
Table 2.2 presents the number and probability of growth accelerations by region 
and decade.  Looking at the growth experience by decades requires two caveats. The 
decade of the 1950s and 1990s have substantially fewer observations than the thirty 
intervening years. In the case of the 1990s, the absence is due to the fact that our filter 
requires the calculation of post-transition rates of growth, which means our last feasible 
year is 1992.  In the case of the 1950s, the reason is the lack of pre-transition growth rates 
as well as the fact that many developing countries are absent from the dataset. With these 
caveats about the 1950s and 1990s, growth transitions exhibit a declining trend that may 
have been partially reversed in the 1990s.  
 
If we look at the experience by regions, the largest number of growth 
accelerations is in Asia, with 21 occurrences and an average probability of a growth 
transition of 4.3 percent for the full-sample period. We identified 18 growth accelerations 
in Africa, many more than one commonly associates with this continent, but that still 
adds up to the lowest probability of a growth transition of all the regions: only 1.97 
percent. We identified 17 growth transitions in Latin America but this adds to a below-
average probability of 2.48 percent. We identified 12 growth transitions in Europe, but 5 
of them were in the 1950s when the region was recovering from WWII.  Europe’s overall 
probability of a growth transition was 2.43 percent but with a rising trend in the 1980s 
and 1990s after very low numbers in the 60s and 70s. There are 10 growth transitions in 
the Middle East and North Africa which add up to the second highest probability. 
However, 9 of the transitions took place before 1980 and are presumably associated with 
oil booms.  
  
 
Table 2.2: Frequency of growth episodes (%) 
Number of growth episodes divided by number of datapoints in that decade and region     
 Region     
Decade  Asia   Africa  Mid. E  Europe  Latin A  Other  Total  Episodes Observations 
1950's  8.33   6.25   16.67  12.82  3.57  14.29  8.44  13  154 
1960's  5.13    3.70    4.48 0.76 2.63  8.70 3.33  23  691 
1970's  2.86    2.51    5.26 0.00 2.66  2.33 2.42  23  952 
1980's  4.43    0.56    1.02 2.78 0.92  0.00 1.56  16  1026 
1990's  2.50    1.14    0.00 4.26 5.26  5.56 2.92  8  274 
Total   4.09   1.91   3.61  2.34  2.40  3.55  2.68  83  3097 
Episodes  21  18  10 12 17  5  83     
Observations  514  944  277 513 708  141 3,097     
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  Since we are interested in both the initiation of episodes of rapid growth and in 
whether or not the rapid growth is sustained, we also calculate the growth rates starting 
eight years after the initiation of the episode.  Obviously the longer the time period we 
consider after the initiation of a growth episode, the more we lose recent accelerations.  
Table 2.3 presents the growth episodes by their growth rate in the seven years preceding 
their growth acceleration and in the ten years following their episode of growth 
acceleration (i.e., in years [t+7, t+17]).  
 
  This exercise distinguishes those episodes that were and were not sustained into 
the longer term.  We choose 2 percent growth as our threshold as this is (roughly) the 
OECD average over the long term and hence is the rate which a country would need to 
grow to converge with the industrial countries.  Of the 69 growth episodes for which this 
calculation can be undertaken, 16 had negative growth after the end of the episode, 16 
had slow growth (between 0 and 2) and 37 had rapid growth.  Figure 2.1 shows six 
examples in which growth was sustained at a rapid pace after the first eight years of fast 
growth.  
 
Figure 2.2 shows six examples of countries that experienced growth acceleration 
followed by negative growth (Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, Algeria) or slow growth 
(Colombia, Brazil).  Pakistan is an interesting case, as it had two episodes, one in 1962, 
which was initiated from falling output in the previous seven years and was followed by 
slow growth in the 1970s (1.8 ppa), and then another episode of rapid growth in 1979, 
which was followed by growth of 2.3 ppa in the 1990s.  
 
Table 2.3 also distinguishes between those episodes that began from negative, 
slow, or above average growth.  While 15 of these 69 episodes were preceded by falling 
output, 22/69 were initiated from slow and 32 of 60 from above average growth.   
 
Countries on the upper left hand corner had negative growth before and after the 
growth episode. As can be seen, this group is dominated by African countries.  Countries 
in the lower row had high growth after the eight-year period. This group is dominated by 
East Asian and European countries. This differentiation suggests that it would be 
interesting to inquire about the determinants of whether a given growth acceleration is 
sustained or not after the initial eight-year period. We will look more deeply into this in 
section 4.  
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Table 2.3:  Episodes of rapid growth classified by growth rates before and after the episode 
 
  Growth rate in the eight years before the initiation of the episode of 
rapid growth (t, t-7) 




(>=0 & <2) 
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Figure 2.1:  Examples of growth episodes that were sustained 
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Figure 2.2:  Examples of growth episodes that were not sustained  




2.B) Robustness of the definition of a growth episode. 
 
Before launching into further analysis of the correlates of growth episodes we will 
discuss three issues with the robustness of our method of identifying growth 
accelerations: (a) the parameters that define a growth episode, (b) the data used, and (c) 
statistical issues.   
  
Parameters of the “filter”.  We can illustrate the function of the filter by showing 
graphically the initiation of a growth episode and then three examples of countries that 
meet one or more but not all of the conditions.  A classic growth acceleration is Indonesia 
in 1967.  In the years before 1967 growth was -0.8 ppa while in the eight years after 1967 
growth was 5.5 ppa, for a growth acceleration of 6.3 percentage points. 
 
The key element in the filter is the combination of both a high level of growth and 
a significant acceleration of growth. There are many cases in which growth improves 
substantially but does not reach the threshold of “rapid.”  Using an eight-year period and 
the thresholds of 3.5 ppa growth and a 2.0 ppa increase are defensible, but admittedly 
arbitrary.  Obviously shortening the horizon of eight years identifies far more episodes 
than 83.  For example, using five-year growth rates identifies 125 episodes versus only 37 
using ten-year horizons. 
 
  Tightening or relaxing the thresholds of the filter produces the expected results.  If 
the threshold for change is 2 ppa but the growth threshold is raised to 4.0 ppa then only 
68 episodes are identified versus 90 if the threshold is 3.0.  With the threshold for 
absolute growth at 3.5 ppa, raising the acceleration threshold to 2.5 yields only 67 
episodes while lowering it to 1.5 identifies 93 episodes.  We shall present a set of 
robustness checks with these varying cutoffs when we discuss the predictability of 
growth accelerations in section 4.     
 
  In a similar exercise of examining the determinants of growth breaks (but which 
does not distinguish between accelerations and decelerations) Jones and Olken (2004a) 
use an algorithm that allows an arbitrary number of breaks and does not constrain these to 
be separated by any given number of years.  This has the expected effect of allowing 
many “breaks” quite close together—so, while we identify one acceleration in Uganda’s 
growth (in 1989) their method allows three breaks within 5 years.   
 
Data.  Unless otherwise noted we use the Penn World Tables version 6.1 data.  In 
order to be sure that our estimates of growth episodes were robust to using a different 
series for GDP per capita we also implemented exactly the same procedures using data 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (see Table 2.4).  Since the WDI 
data begin in 1960, 27 of the 83 episodes lack adequate data for comparison.  Of the 56 
possible episodes for which there are WDI data 25 (45%) are identified as episodes with 
exactly the same dates, 15 (27%) are identified as episodes with dates of initiation 
differing by two years or less and another 6 (11%) are identified as episodes—but with  
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dates of initiation differing by more than two years.
1  So on 81% of the 56 episodes there 
is agreement on the basics.  We take this to be encouraging.  
 
Ten of the 56 PWT-identified episodes produce different results when WDI data 
are used.  Four of the PWT episodes show an acceleration of growth but either do not 
meet the threshold for rapid growth of 3.5% (MWI, GNB) or the change in growth is less 
than 2 points (MYS, URY).  This leaves six episodes on which the data sources just 
disagree, including four instances in which the PWT data suggest an acceleration and the 
WDI data show a fall in growth.   
 
Table 2.4:   The 10 episodes identified in PWT data but not in WDI data… and the episodes in WDI data but 
not in PWT data 
  PWT 6.2 Data    WDI data 












MWI 1992  -0.8  4.8  5.6    -0.6  2.0  2.6 
GNB 1988  -0.7  5.2  5.9    -0.7 1.5  2.2 
MYS 1970  3.0  5.1  2.1    3.4  5.2  1.8 
URY 1989  1.6  3.8  2.1    1.8  3.2  1.4 
LKA 1979  1.9  4.1  2.2    3.3  3.3  0.0 
PAN 1975  2.6  5.3  2.7    2.7  2.3  -0.4 
MWI 1970  1.5  3.9  2.5    3.6  2.9  -0.7 
SYR 1974  2.6  4.8  2.2    5.0  4.2  -0.8 
TCD 1973  -0.7  7.3  8.0    -1.6 -3.5  -1.9 
HTI 1990 -2.3 12.7  15.0    -1.4  -5.0  -3.6 
Episodes identified in WDI data but not in PWT data 
CHL   1.3  3.3 2.0  1974  0.3  3.8  3.5 
KEN   2.6  4.3 1.7  1967  2.5  5.2  2.8 
CRI   1.9  3.3 1.4  1967  1.8  4.0  2.1 
SGP   3.4  4.6 1.2  1987  3.7  6.1  2.4 
LSO  -1.5  -0.5 1.0  1985  -0.8  3.7  4.4 
GAB   7.7 4.2 -3.5  1969  5.4  13.7  8.4 
  
Statistical issues.  There are two major ways in which we differ from similar 
literature.  Papell and Ben David (1997) examine changes in growth by a similar search 
over possible breaks in trend and then examine all and only “statistically significant” 
changes in growth rates.
2  This is not appropriate for our interests because this will 
identify growth changes of very different magnitude because of the differing statistical 
power caused by the underlying variability of the output series.  It is possible that if a 
“statistical significance” cut-off were used two countries with exactly the same 
magnitude acceleration to exactly the same rate of growth but with different underlying 
annual volatility could be classified differently.  Since we identify growth changes of 
                                                 
1 The episodes are (with PWT then WDI dating):  ZWE 64 (67), Korea 62 (67), Paraguay 74 (70), Algeria 
75 (71), Egypt 76 (73), China 78 (81).   
2 Bai and Perron (1998) extend this to multiple structural breaks and discuss problems with small sample 
properties of such tests.  
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substantial magnitude our 83 episodes are also (almost) all statistically significant.
3  
There could be many “statistically significant” accelerations of growth that we do not 
classify as episodes, because the increase in growth is economically not meaningful.  
 
The second issue is whether we use a log-linear trends or first differences to 
estimate growth rates.  Perron (1989) and others (Jones and Olken 2004a) have modeled 
the evolution of output as a I(1) process so that first differences are stationary and hence 
testing for “breaks” is testing differences in means of first differences.  We suspect that 
for our purposes nothing particularly significant hangs on this distinction in the modeling 
of the evolution of output.  
 
 
3. Growth accelerations: basic results 
 
At what income levels are growth transitions more likely? Basic convergence 
stories hold that growth accelerations are more likely for poorer countries.  We split the 
data into income quartiles (Table 3.1) and find that for the period as a whole there is a 
monotonically declining probability of a growth transition with rising levels of income as 
would be implied by a global growth process that shows convergence. However, this is 
not true of all decades. Probabilities slope steeply downwards in the 1970s and were 
surprisingly flat in the 1990s. In the 1960s the lower half of the distribution performed 
better than the upper half.
4 In the 1980s the bottom half did worse than the upper half. 
These patterns are not unlike the aggregate growth experience by decade, in that the 
1960s were a good time for poor countries while the 1980s have been terrible.  
 
Table 3.1:  Acceleration probabilities: income quartiles against 
decade and region 
         
  Income Quartile (4 is the highest)   
Decade 1  2  3  4  Total  Episodes 
50  8.11   5.13   10.53  10.00  8.44  13  
60  5.26   2.89   1.75  3.41  3.33  23  
70  3.83   3.36   2.53  0.00  2.42  23  
80  1.19   1.55   1.96  1.54  1.56  16  
90  2.99   2.90   2.90  2.90  2.92  8  
Total  3.41   2.70   2.60  2.03  2.68  83 
Episodes 26  21  20  16 83   
 
 
As a precursor to a detailed examination using regression analysis, it is interesting 
to ask what simple correlates seem to be associated with the start of a growth transition. 
This can be done by looking at the average value of a certain variable around the date of 
the growth transition, which we take to be the years t-1, t and t+1 where t is the date of 
the acceleration and compare it to the value of that same variable during the 7 previous 
                                                 
3 At the 10% level the exceptions of Syria 74, Malawi 70, and Uruguay 89.  There are four countries 
between the 5 and 10 percent significance level (Finland 92, Singapore 69, Uganda 77, Algeria 75).   
4 However, the top quartile did better than the second quartile.  
   
15
years. We ask the question whether changes in that variable are significantly different 
from zero. Another aspect we can study is the correlates of growth during a growth 
transition, in which case we compare the period covered between year t and year t+7 to 
the average for the four years prior to the acceleration [t-1 through t-4]. 
 
The results for both calculations are presented in Table 3.2. We study investment, 
exports, imports, the real exchange rate and inflation. We find that growth accelerations 
coincide with an increase in the export and import ratios which average 10.7 and 8.7 
percent respectively, with increases in the investment ratio of 16 percent and by a large 
real depreciation of 21.7 percent. All these results are highly statistically significant. We 
do not find, however, that the terms of trade changes at the time of a growth acceleration 
are significantly different from zero, although the estimated change is positive. We also 
find a positive but not statistically significant increase in inflation at the time of the 
transition. This result could mean that some growth accelerations take place in the 
context of the resolution of a macroeconomic crisis.  
 
If we look instead at these same variables during the 8-year growth acceleration, 
instead of just around the start of the process we find similar results except for the real 
exchange rate. Export, import and investment ratios rise by an average of 14.6, 14.2 and 
14.9 percent, respectively.  However, real exchange rate changes are no longer 
statistically different from zero and the estimated coefficient is now a fourth of the 
estimated change at the time of the acceleration.  
 
Obviously, these results do not imply causality. However, it is interesting to note 
that growth accelerations seem to require more investment, more exports and a more 
competitive real exchange rate. Hence, they do not seem to happen by pure accelerations 
in total factor productivity or in the increased import capacity emanating from a greater 
availability of external funding.  
 
  Table 3.2: Correlates of growth accelerations 
   TOT  Imports  Exports  Inflation  Investment RER 
Around the start (%)  2.5  8.7 10.7  434.0  16.0 -21.7 
  t-stat 0.51    2.15 2.37 1.24  2.51   -3.54 
  p value  0.61   0.04 0.02 0.22  0.01   0.01 
  Number 41    41 41 52  76   11 
            
In the 8-year period (%)  2.8  14.2 14.6  -90.7  14.9  -5.2 
  t-stat 0.66    3.36 4.35  -0.51  4.25   -0.71 
  p value  0.51   0.00 0.00 0.61  0.00   0.49 
  Number 45    50 50 58  83   15 
            
 
            
 
 
4.  Predictors of growth transitions 
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We have shown in the preceding that growth accelerations are a fairly common 
occurrence.  Our data allows us to identify growth episodes over a maximum time span of 
35 years (1957-1992) and yields 83 such episodes.  Hence in any given year, there are 
between 2 and 3 new growth transitions that are initiated around the world.  In this 
section, we analyze the predictability of these transitions.  In particular, we ask: how well 
do the standard explanatory variables do in predicting the timing of growth accelerations.  
We focus on three types of predictors, relating to (a) the external context, (b) domestic 
economic policies, and (c) political circumstances.  We first analyze all growth 
transitions taken together, and then distinguish between those that are sustained in the 
longer term and those that aren’t.   
 
As we shall see, these three categories of explanatory variables have some 
leverage in predicting growth transitions.  Furthermore, sustained and unsustained growth 
accelerations tend to be associated with somewhat different triggers.  Perhaps the most 
important conclusion of this section, however, pertains to the unpredictability of growth 
accelerations.  Despite a somewhat liberal interpretation of what predictability means in 
this context, we find that there is only a loose link between favorable external, economic, 
or political conditions (as measured by conventional explanatory determinants) and 
growth accelerations.   In particular, standard economic reform packages have marginal 
effects on the probability that a growth transition will be initiated.     
 
4.A) Methods and data   
 
Our dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 around the time of a 
growth acceleration (and 0 otherwise).  More specifically, we assign a value of 1 to the 
three years centered on the first year of the growth episode (i.e., the dummy equals 1 for i 
= t-1, t, and t+1).  The reason we allow a window around t is that there is a certain 
amount of uncertainty that attaches to the identification of a specific year of growth 
acceleration.  A 3-year window reduces the probability that we will narrowly miss the 
timing of an acceleration through quirks in the data or in our method.   
 
Our comparison group for a growth acceleration consists of the countries that 
have not had a growth episode in that same year.  So our sample consists of all countries 
for which the relevant data are available, including countries that have not experienced 
growth episodes.  We make the following adjustments to the sample.  First, for each 
country, we drop the first and last seven years of data, since growth episodes could not 
have been calculated for those years.
5  Second, we drop all data pertaining to years 
t+2…t+7 of an episode, since we are interested in predicting the timing of accelerations.   
 
We run probits where the dependent variable (the 3-year window around the date 
of the year of growth acceleration) is regressed on several determinants.  We will also 
present estimates with alternative estimation strategies.  All our runs contain a full set of 
year effects to control for external circumstances that are common to all countries.   
                                                 
5 We could also have dropped data for years in which a growth episode is not initiated (t-1, t, t+1) 
somewhere in the world.  However, this would have no practical effect on our sample since the years t-1, t, 
t+1 of growth episodes span the entire sample from 1957 to 1992.  
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Our explanatory variables can be categorized under three headings. 
 
(i) External shocks.  It is plausible that many growth accelerations are triggered 
by favorable external conditions.  To capture this, we rely on a variable that is based on 
the terms of trade.  This is a dummy variable, TOT_Thresh90, which takes the value 1 
whenever the change in the terms of trade from year t to t-4 is in the upper 90% of the 
entire sample.  This variable is meant to capture exceptionally favorable external 
circumstances.  We could also have used a variable related to capital inflows, but such 
flows are endogenous and (presumably) forward-looking, rendering causal inference 
problematic.  
 
  (ii) Political changes.  Growth accelerations can also be triggered by changes in 
the underlying political balance as revealed by transformations in the political regime.  
We use several variables to measure political regime change.  Regchange takes a value of 
1 in the five-year period beginning with a regime change as recorded in the Polity IV 
dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).  (Regime change is defined as either a three-unit 
change in the polity score or as regime interruption.)  Poschange is 1 during this five-year 
period if the regime change increased the Polity score (variable CHANGE in the Polity 
IV dataset), denoting a movement towards greater democracy.  Negchange is defined 




  While the Polity variables are the main ones we use, we will also show results 
with additional political variables.  Lead Death is a dummy for the five-year period 
starting with a political leader’s death. Tenure is an interaction term between Lead Death 
and the length of the tenure of the dying ruler.  These variables come from Jones and 
Olken (2004b).  War End is a dummy for the five-year period beginning with the 
cessation of an armed conflict from the Correlates of War International War Database 
(Singer and Small 2003).
7 Civil War is a dummy for the five-year period beginning with 
the ending of an armed civil war.
8  
 
  (iii) Economic reform.  Perhaps the most important potential determinant from 
our perspective is a change in economic policy that is conducive to higher economic 
growth.  To quantify such a change in economic policy, we rely primarily on an index 
that was originally developed by Sachs and Warner (1995) and which has been 
subsequently revised and updated by Wacziarg and Welch (2003).  The Sachs-Warner 
index was meant to capture changes in an economy’s openness to trade, but as argued in 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001), the coding incorporated a number of structural features 
(e.g. presence of marketing boards, socialist economic regimes) and the macroeconomic 
environment (e.g. presence of a large black-market premium for foreign currency), in 
addition to tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade.  The Wacziarg-Welch (2003) update 
                                                 
6 Note that any change in the Polity score that is larger in absolute value than 20 (indicating Authority 
Interruption or Authority Collapse, etc.) is coded as a zero. 
7 This variable is given as yearlef and yearlef2 in the original Correlates of War International War 
Database.  
8 This variable is given as yearend1 and yearend2 in the original Correlates of War Civil War Database.  
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continues with the same basic approach.  This makes the Sachs-Warner-Wacziar-Welch 
(SWWW) index a good candidate for a measure that captures broad economic reforms.  
Hence we code Econ_Lib as a dummy that takes the value of 1 during the first five years 
of a transition towards “openness” a la SWWW. 
 
  In addition, we use a measure of financial liberalization, Finance, which is a 
dummy for the first five years of a financial liberalization episode.  The timing of 
financial liberalization is taken from Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001).   
 
4.B)  Results   
 
Table 4.1 presents the main probit results.  Our baseline specification, shown in 
column (1), includes the terms-of-trade shock, political regime change, and economic 
liberalization.  The first two of these enter with statistically significant coefficients.  
According to the estimates, a large positive terms-of-trade shock (as defined above) 
increases the probability of experiencing a growth acceleration by 4.4 percentage points.  
A political regime change increases this probability by 5.3 percentage points.  In this 
baseline specification, economic reform does not have a statistically significant impact on 
growth acceleration, although its estimated coefficient is (as expected) positive.   
 
In the next three columns we probe the political determinants more deeply.  
Column (2) decomposes the political regime change into a positive (towards democracy) 
and negative (towards autocracy) component.  The striking result is that while both of 
these are separately significant, the impact of a movement towards autocracy is more than 
three times larger (10.8 points versus 2.9 points).  Column (3) shows that a political 
leader’s death has a negative (but insignificant) impact on the likelihood of a growth 
acceleration.  When the leader’s death is interacted with the length of the leader’s tenure 
(column 4), we get stronger results:  a leader’s death is particularly damaging if that 
leader has not been in office for very long.  According to the estimates in column (4), a 
leader’s death has a positive impact on growth acceleration when his tenure starts to 
exceed about 10 years. 
 
Column (5) shows that financial liberalization has a strong positive impact on the 
probability of experiencing a growth acceleration, increasing this probability by 7 
percentage points.  For some countries, mostly developed ones, the financial 
liberalization variable is censored at 1980. In column (6), we enter a dummy variable 
(Finance_Dev) that allows countries with censored values to have a different effect for 
Finance, and we still get a very strong impact from financial liberalization.  Note that the 
estimated coefficient on economic reform turns negative when Finance is included in the 
regression (but it remains insignificant).  Columns (7), (8) and (9) show that armed 
conflict (external or internal) does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of a 
growth acceleration. 
 
Finally, columns (10) and (11) drop the terms of trade variable to regain 
additional observations (allowing the sample size to rise from 2140 to 2903).  The main 
results are similar.  In particular, economic reform remains insignificant and a political  
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regime change in the direction of autocracy still shows up as a strong predictor of growth 
acceleration. 
 
Our baseline results are quite robust to the method of estimation.  Table 4.2 
displays the results for a series of alternative methods.  First, we show the results for 
probits where standard errors are clustered by individual countries and corrected for 
heteroskedasticity (column 1).  Next we run a Tobit regressions, making use of the actual 
difference in growth post-acceleration and treating non-episodes as censored at 0 (column 
2).  Third, we show the results from a modified logit framework suggested by King and 
Zeng (2001) that is designed to better handle rare-ocurrence bias (column 3).  Finally, we 
run a random-effects probit (column 4).  The results in all cases are not only qualitatively, 
but also quantitatively similar.  This is reassuring, and suggests that the probit results we 
reported above are broadly representative.            
 
The probits in Table 4.1 utilize the entire sample of countries, including 
developed countries.  As another kind of robustness check, we present in Table 4.3 the 
analogous results for a sample that includes only developing countries.  In most respects, 
the findings are quite similar.  We note three small changes.  First, “positive” political 
regime change (i.e., democratization) is no longer statistically associated with growth 
accelerations.  It is only movements towards autocracy that enters with a statistically 
significant and positive coefficient.  Second, the estimated impact of financial 
liberalization is much larger and almost double that found in the previous table.  Third, 
economic reform now enters with a statistically significant coefficient in runs that 
exclude the terms of trade variable (columns 9 and 10). 
 
Our final set of robustness checks relate to the parameters of the filter and the 
dataset we use.  We discussed in section 2 alternative thresholds and the changes that 
occur when we use WDI data instead of the PWT.  We get a somewhat different set of 
growth accelerations depending on choices make on each of these.  To see how much 
difference this makes in practice, Table 4.4 shows the results of our baseline specification 
as we vary the set of growth accelerations.  The main message is the robustness of the 
political determinant.  “Negative” political change is uniformly significant, with 
coefficients that vary from 0.05 to 0.12.  “Positive” political change is almost always 
significant, but enters with much smaller coefficients.  The terms-of-trade variable 
generally enters with the correct (i.e. positive) sign and is significant, with the exception 
of two instances when it enters with a negative (but insignificant) coefficient.  Economic 
reform remains insignificant (with the exception of one instance).        
 
We will further analyze and interpret these findings below.  But first we want to 
emphasize the limited success that our right-hand side variables collectively achieve in 
predicting these major growth turnarounds.  Even though many of the explanatory 
variables are statistically significant, they explain very little of the growth pattern that the 
data reveal.  This point can be made in a number of different ways.  For example, the 
average in-sample predicted probability of growth acceleration generated by our baseline 
probit conditional on an acceleration having taken place is only 0.101 (compared to an 
unconditional prediction of 0.066).  In other words, our empirical framework yields a 9-
to-1 odds against a growth takeoff for those takeoffs that actually materialized.    
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This reflects the poor match between occurrences of growth takeoffs and 
favorable external, economic or political circumstances.  A lot of takeoffs take place 
when those conditions appear not to be particularly favorable, at least as measured by 
standard indicators.  And growth takeoffs typically fail to materialize when the conditions 
are indeed favorable.  This is shown more systematically in Table 4.5 which displays the 
proportions of growth accelerations that are preceded or accompanied by changes in our 
list of determinants, and, conversely, proportions of changes in the determinants that are 
accompanied or followed by growth accelerations.
9  Of particular interest is the 
predictive power of the economic reform variable (Econ_Lib).  Since this variable rarely 
enters significantly, we know that it does not have great leverage on the timing of growth 
accelerations.  Indeed, the table shows that only 14.5 percent accelerations are associated 
with economic liberalization—or, equivelently, that 85.5 percent of growth accelerations 
are not preceded or accompanied by liberalizations.  And fewer than one in five episodes 
(18.2 percent) of economic liberalization are followed by growth take-offs.  More than 
half of growth accelerations are preceded by political-regime changes; on the other hand, 
only a tiny proportion of political-regime changes (13.6%) are followed by growth 
accelerations.      
 
4.C)  Sustained versus unsustained growth accelerations   
 
The results we have just discussed reveal some interesting, but also puzzling 
associations.  It is not clear a prori why transitions to autocracy should have more 
favorable effects on growth accelerations than transitions to democracy.  Nor is it clear 
why financial liberalization should have such a potent impact on the likelihood of growth 
accelerations when the impact of our broader measure of economic reform is weak at 
best.  It turns out that it is much easier to understand and interpret these results once we 
distinguish between growth accelerations that are sustained into the longer term and those 
that are not.     
 
  Remember that our growth accelerations are defined for a time horizon of eight 
years.  That is, we require post-transition growth rates to be higher than pre-transition 
rates by at least 2 percentage points and also to remain above 3.5 percent during this 
eight-year period.  We now make a distinction among accelerations according to whether 
they were sustained beyond that eight year horizon.  We call those episodes where the 
growth rate remained above 2 percent in years [t+7 , t+17] sustained episodes, and those 
where the growth rate fell below the 2 percent threshold unsustained episodes. Since this 
classification requires 16 data points beyond the onset of a growth acceleration, not all 
episodes can be classified as such.
10  Therefore in the regressions below we have to work 
with a somewhat smaller sample.    
                                                 
9 As in the probits, we allow for a maximum of five years’ lag between a change in the determinant and the 
growth acceleration. The timing of the latter is the three-year window centered on the dates listed in Table 
2.1.  Whenever this three-year window overlaps with the five-year window for the determinants, we count 
it as a case where growth acceleration coincides with one of its determinants.    
10 But we did not automatically exclude all countries that do not have data from t+7 to t+17 to keep the 
sample reasonable.  If a country has data from t+7 to t+13, the growth rate for t+7 to t+17 is defined as the 
annual average growth rate over this time.  
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  The first two columns of Table 4.6 show that the earlier results are more or less 
replicated in this truncated sample.  However, economic reform is now marginally 
significant, while financial liberalization is marginally insignificant.  We next distinguish 
between sustained and unsustained accelerations and use them in turn as the dependent 
variable.  The results are interesting.  The next four columns show that there are 
significant differences in the determinants of the two types of growth accelerations.  Most 
striking among these differences are the following:  (1) Positive terms of trade shocks are 
conducive only to unsustained episodes; they have no predictive power over sustained 
episodes.  (2) Economic reform has a statistically and quantitatively significant impact on 
the likelihood of sustained accelerations.  (3) Financial liberalization’s positive impact is 
confined to unsustained accelerations.  (4) Positive political change (democratization) has 
a significant impact on sustained episodes but not unsustained episodes.     
 
  These results strongly suggest that sustained and unsustained growth accelerations 
tend to be triggered by different conditions.  Financial liberalization and positive external 
shocks are associated with growth accelerations that eventually fizzle out.  Fundamental 
economic reform and positive political regime change increase the likelihood of sustained 
accelerations.   
 
However, we need to repeat the same caveat as before: the predictability of these 
different kinds of growth episodes still remains extremely low.  The determinants of 
growth episodes—whether of the sustained or unsustained kind—are very poorly 
captured by our explanatory variables.  The bottom panel of Table 4.5 shows the relevant 
numbers.  Only 16.2 percent of sustained growth episodes are preceded or accompanied 
by economic liberalization, while only 9.1 percent of economic liberalizations are 
followed by sustained growth take-offs.  Growth accelerations seem to be driven largely 
by idiosyncratic causes.  To paraphrase Tolstoy, not even happy families are alike.   
 
            
5. Conclusions 
 
  We have focused in this paper on instances of significant acceleration in 
economic growth.  We close the paper by reiterating what we think are the two main 
surprises that come out of our analysis.  First, growth accelerations are a fairly frequent 
occurrence.  Of the 110 countries included in the sample, 60 have had at least one 
acceleration in the 35-year period between 1957 and 1992—a ratio of 55 percent.  
Whatever else this may say about growth, it certainly suggests that achieving rapid 
growth over the medium term is not something that is tremendously difficult and it is 
well within most countries’ reach (see also Rodrik 2003).  This is a useful antidote to the 
pessimism that often pervades policy discussions on growth. 
 
  Second, and not unrelated to the previous finding, most growth accelerations are 
not preceded or accompanied by major changes in economic policies, institutional 
arrangements, political circumstances, or external conditions.
11  As we have shown, 
                                                 
11 For a specific instance of this finding, see Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) on India.  
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standard growth determinants have some statistical leverage over the timing of 
accelerations.  But on the whole those determinants do a very poor job of predicting the 
turning points.  It would appear that growth accelerations are caused predominantly by 
idiosyncratic, and often small-scale, changes.  The search for the common elements in 
these idiosyncratic determinants—to the extent that there are any—is an obvious area for 
future research.    
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 Table 4.1: Predicting growth accelerations
Dependent variable is a dummy for the timing of growth accelerations.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
TOT Thresh90 0.044 0.045 0.044 0.042 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.037
(2.60)** (2.62)** (2.57)* (2.51)* (2.59)** (2.52)* (2.51)* (2.55)* (2.49)*
Econ Lib 0.021 0.022 0.020 0.020 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.008 0.019 0.020
(1.040) (1.100) (1.030) (1.040) (0.710) (0.790) (0.790) (0.780) (0.490) (1.060) (1.120)
RegChange 0.053 0.042
(4.74)** (4.07)**
PosChange 0.029 0.030 0.027 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.010
(1.97)* (2.10)* (1.93)+ (2.08)* (1.90)+ (1.90)+ (1.96)* (1.97)* (0.700)
NegChange 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.088 0.084 0.085 0.089 0.091 0.100
(5.80)** (5.83)** (5.85)** (5.33)** (5.22)** (5.24)** (5.47)** (5.46)** (5.83)**
Leader Death -0.027 -0.057 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009
(1.240) (1.99)* (0.150) (0.170) (0.170) (0.160) (0.200)
Tenure 0.006 -0.036 -0.038 -0.038 -0.038 -0.037
(2.12)* (2.92)** (2.83)** (2.83)** (2.81)** (2.94)**
Finance 0.071 0.105 0.105 0.108
(2.79)** (2.71)** (2.71)** (2.77)**
Finance Dev -0.026 -0.026 -0.027
(1.000) (1.000) (1.090)
War End -0.002 0.011 0.009
(0.130) (0.640) (0.530)
Civil War -0.025 -0.025
(1.380) (1.310)
Observations 2140 2140 2140 2140 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 2903 2903
Growth episodes 
included 51/83 51/84 51/85 51/86 45/81 45/82 45/83 45/84 45/85 83/83 83/38
Pseudo R^2 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.06
Notes:  Estimated by probit.  Coefficients shown are marginal probabilites evaluated at the sample means.  
Numbers in paranthesis are robust t-statistics.  All regressions include year dummy variables.  See text for sources.
+ indicates significance at the 10% level, * indicates significance at the 5% level, 
** indicates significance at the 1% level.Table 4.2: Robustness to alternative estimation methods
Cluster Tobit Relogit Relogit M RE
TOT_thresh90 0.045 2.543 0.635 0.048 0.480
(1.92)+ (2.24)* (2.69)** (2.92)**
Econ Lib 0.022 1.494 0.372 0.023 0.053
(0.70) (1.10) (1.29) (0.26)
0.029 2.176 0.439 0.031 0.291
Poschange (1.35) (2.22)* (1.83)+ (1.95)+
0.108 5.821 1.255 0.125 1.053
Negchange (3.62)** (5.48)** (6.01)** (6.06)**
Obs 2140 2140 2140 2140
Cluster is a dprobit regression with standard errors clustered for each country group and corrected for heteroskedasticity.
Tobit is a tobit regression where non episodes are coded with a 0. There is no correction for heteroskedasticity.
Relogit is a logit model corrected for rare occurance bias as suggested by King and Zeng (2001).
Relogit M are the coefficients of the relogit model given as attributable risk.
This is the expected change in the probability of an episode going from a 0 in the dependent variable to a 1.
RE is a probit regression with country random effects. There is no correction for heteroskedasticity.
RE M is the marginal effect given at the mean for the dependent variable of the random effects probit regression.
See also notes from previous table.Table 4.3: Predicting growth accelerations (developing countries only)
Dependent variable is a dummy for the timing of growth accelerations.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
TOT Thresh90 0.044 0.045 0.044 0.015 0.047 0.045 0.046 0.046
(2.34)* (2.40)* (2.35)* (2.05)* (2.34)* (2.16)* (2.20)* (2.26)*
Econ Lib 0.038 0.037 0.034 0.013 -0.003 -0.008 -0.009 0.002 0.040 0.043
(1.590) (1.580) (1.490) (1.470) (0.130) (0.320) (0.330) (0.070) (1.81)+ (1.96)*
RegChange 0.043 0.038
(3.40)** (3.44)**
PosChange 0.016 0.018 0.003 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.004
(0.980) (1.090) (0.480) (0.760) (0.750) (0.810) (0.840) (0.280)
NegChange 0.096 0.096 0.041 0.078 0.083 0.087 0.087 0.094
(4.85)** (4.88)** (4.92)** (3.89)** (3.93)** (4.11)** (4.17)** (5.40)**




Finance 0.181 0.193 0.197
(2.71)** (2.81)** (2.87)**
War End -0.006 0.012 0.005
(0.300) (0.460) (0.210)
Civil War -0.035 -0.027
(1.210) (0.910)
Observations 1620 1620 1620 1620 1382 1321 1321 1382 2275 2275
Pseudo R^2 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.1 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.06




















TOT_thresh90 0.0446 -0.016 0.029 0.040 0.0223 0.046 0.0387 -0.0241
(2.62)** (0.950) (2.63)** (2.17)* (1.55) (2.69)** (2.58)** (1.49)
Econ Lib 0.0217 0.048 -0.004 0.024 0.0109 0.029 0.0248 -0.0208
(1.10) (2.10)* (0.31) (1.13) (0.67) (1.42) (1.42) (0.98)
Poschange 0.0286 0.000 0.077 0.018 0.0354 0.032 0.0275 0.0393
(1.97)* (0.010) (6.11)** (1.16) (2.72)** (2.16)* (2.05)* (2.61)**
Negchange 0.108 0.081 0.05 0.12 0.1104 0.12 0.1067 0.0984
(5.80)** (4.19)** (4.03)** (5.86)** (6.39)** (6.29)** (6.22)** (5.19)**
Obs 2140 2381 1835 2101 2123 2126 2121 1856
Pseudo R^2 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Notes: Same as Table 4.1.Table 4.5: Predictability of growth accelerations
(a)  All growth episodes
Proportion of growth accelerations that are preceded or accompanied by:
Economic liberalization 14.5%
Political regime change 50.6%
External shock 27.5%
Proportion of occurrences of column variable that is accompanied or followed by growth accelerations:
Economic liberalization 18.2%
Political regime change 13.6%
External shock 5.1%
(b)  Sustained growth episodes only
Proportion of growth accelerations that are preceded or accompanied by:
Economic liberalization 16.2%
Political regime change 56.8%
External shock 23.5%
Proportion of occurrences of column variable that is accompanied or followed by growth accelerations:
Economic liberalization 9.1%
Political regime change 7.1%
External shock 1.4%
Notes: As in the probits, we allow for a five-year lag between a change in the underlying determinant 
and a growth acceleration.  The timing of the growth acceleration is the three year window centered 
on the initiation dates shown in Table 2.1. Table 4.6: Sustained and unsustained growth accelerations
dependent variable
All All Sustained Sustained Sustained Unsustained
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TOT_thresh90 0.079 0.082 0.002 0.012 0.019
(3.44)** (3.85)** (0.23) (1.20) (3.72)**
Poschange 0.039 0.047 0.033 0.051 0.006 0.001
(1.81)+ (2.37)* (2.34)* (3.74)** (0.43) (0.28)
NegChange 0.123 0.120 0.038 0.039 0.042 0.021
(5.49)** (5.65)** (2.67)** (2.82)** (2.68)** (4.87)**
Econ Lib 0.078 0.079 0.171 0.112
(1.87)+ (1.94)+ (4.14)** (4.03)**
Finance 0.073 0.997
(1.49) (8.99)**
obs 1222 1337 1034 1197 1485 1164
pseudo R^2 0.11 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.13 0.16
Notes:  Same as Table 4.1 